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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
SALES-IMPLIED WARRANTY-LIABILITY OF PRODUCER
Mrs. LeBlanc, consumer, sued the Louisiana Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Company for damages sustained due to a deleterious sub-
stance contained in their product. The usual defenses in a case
of this kind were employed, namely, that the plant is equipped
with the most modern machinery, and utilizes all possible sani-
tary precautions, which factors allegedly preclude the possibility
of foreign substance entering the bottle while in the plant of the
defendant. Justice McCaleb, speaking for the majority of the
court, concluded that due to the nature of the defendant's enter-
prise, such as advertising and representing the quality of its
product to the consumer, the injured plaintiff may collect dam-
ages on the basis of implied warranty. A strong dissent by Jus-
tice Hawthorne epitomized the importance of this decision by
emphasizing the many problems which, being unsatisfactorily
resolved, impair the validity of the conclusion. In a concurring
opinion, Justice LeBlanc agreed with the result reached by the
majority, but heartily disapproved with the reasoning employed-
the use of implied warranty. LeBlanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola
Bottling Company, 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873 (1952).
With the exception of two appellate court decisions,' all
previous cases of this type have been decided on the basis of
negligence and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.2 It has been
necessary for the plaintiff to prove first, that he was damaged,
second, that the injury was due to the deleterious substance in
1. Dye v. American Beverage Co.. 194 So. 438 (La. App. 1940); Hill v.
Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 170 So. 45 (La. Apip. 1936). It is interesting
to note that both these decisions were written by the author of the majority
opinion in the LeBZanc case. Also, they are based on implied warranty,
rather than negligence.
2. Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference-A Discussion of
the Louisiana Cases, 4 LouISTANA LAW Rvirw 70, 98 (1941). Although Pro-
fessor Malone contends that the actual basis for the cases is warranty, with
res ipsa loquitur serving merely as "window dressing," the writer of this note
is of the opinion that the cases cited therein use res ipsa loquitur as the real
foundation for the decisions. See Comments, 23 Tulane L. Rev. 130 (1948),
23 Tulane L. Rev. 96 (1948). But see Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts
297 (1941), where it is pointed out that the size of the article will affect the
application of res ipsa loquitur. Even due care might not have discovered
the fly in the bottle In the principal case. Even Justice McCaleb admits that
res Ipsa loquitur has previously been used exclusively in cases of this type
(observe especially notes 2 and 3 of the instant case, 221 La. 919, 920, 60 So.
2d 873, 874 [19521), and the resort to common law authority for support of
the warranty doctrine.
Lack of space prevents a discussion of the distinction between explosions
of bottles and deleterious substance contained in bottles, but this writer
feels that the distinction Is untenable.
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the product of the defendant, and finally, and of utmost impor-
tance, that there had been no tampering with the bottle since it
left the plant of the defendant producer.3 The paramount impor-
tance of the instant case lies in its abrogation of the third
requirement. The court reasoned that since the basis of this case
is warranty, and since the showing of tampering would provide
an avenue of escape for the defendant, the burden of proving
same should properly rest upon the defense.
4
Since the decision of the instant case is based on warranty,
the positive provisions of the Civil Code 5 on redhibition should
serve as illumination for an examination of the problems in-
volved. Redhibition is the avoidance of a sale on the ground that
there was some vice or defect in the thing sold, which renders it
useless or so inconvenient that the buyer would not have pur-
chased it if he had known of the vice.0 Certain attributes must be
present for the success of a suit in warranty-reliance by the
vendee, and a hidden defect that the purchaser would not have
noticed, even with the exercise of due care.1 Also, it is incumbent
upon the injured plaintiff to show that the vice existed at the
time of the sale.8 The primary distinction made by the code is
between the liability imposed upon good faith sellers as opposed
to the liability of sellers who knew of the defect. In the former
case, liability extends only to a return of the purchase price. On
the other hand, those vendors who were aware of the vice are
held liable not only for all damages which may have been caused
but also for the restitution of the price. 10
3. This requirement is necessary to fulfill the essential element of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, known as exclusive control. Prosser, Handbook
of the Law of Torts 298 (1941). See also cases cited in Malone, Res Ipsa
Loquitur and Proof by Inference-A Discussion of the Louisiana Cases, 4
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 70, 98 (1941).
4. Also, it was said that the warranty relied upon by the consumer was
that the bottle be wholesome at the time of the final sale. This was possible
because of a finding of direct warranty from manufacturer to consumer.
The distinction is once again drawn between explosions of bottles and those
bottles containing unwholesome substances. See note 2 supra.
5. Art. 2520 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870.
6. Ibid.
7. Art. 2521, La. Civil Code of 1870.
8. Art. 2530, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The buyer who institutes the red-
hibitory action, must prove that the vice existed before the sale was made
to him. If the vice has made its appearance within three days immediately
following the sale, it is presumed to have existed before the sale."
9. Art. 2531, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The seller who knew not the vices
of the thing, is only bound to restore the price, and to reimburse the expenses
occasioned by the sale .. "
10. Art. 2545, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The seller, who knows the vice of
the thing he sells and omits to declare it, besides the restitution of the price
and repayment of the expenses, is answerable to the buyer in damages."
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The distinction between good and bad faith sellers may be
traced to its origin in the rules of the Roman Edicts, where essen-
tially the same stipulations will be found as presently obtain in
the Civil Code of Louisiana." The French Civil Code reflects the
direct influence of the Roman law in this field. 12 However, the
jurisprudence of France has apparently not limited the right of
the abused purchaser to a return of the purchase price, even
though the vendor was in good faith. The words "and expenses
occasioned by the sale"'3 have been extended to include dam-
ages.14 Additional liberalism in French courts is evidenced by
the tendency to impute knowledge of the defect to the vendor,
if he manufactured the article.15 This approach is based on the
theory that the manufacturer either actually knows of the defect,
or is lacking in the skill necessary to his vocation.' 6 In this con-
nection, Pothier has said that no one should publicly make pro-
fession of an art if he is not possessed of all the knowledge neces-
sary for exercising it well. 17
Although Louisiana has not expanded the purview of redhi-
bition principles to such an extent, 8 there is an inclination to
impute knowledge of the defect to the producer, thereby putting
11. Digest 21.1.31.18.
Moyle, Contract of Sale in the Civil Law 195-216 (1892) contains an
excellent discussion of the entire development of warranty in the Roman law.
12. Art. 1641 et seq., French Civil Code. Cf. Digest 21.1.1.8. See also 1
Domat, Civil Law (Strahan's tr. Cushing's 2 ed. 1861); Pothier, Treatise on
the Contract of Sale (Cushing's ed. 1839); Morrow, Warranty of Quality:
A Comparative Survey, 14 Tulane L. Rev. 529 (1940).
13. Art. 1646, French Civil Code.
14. This extension has been referred to as a "misinterpretation" by the
commentators. See 10 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Fran-
cais 137, no 134 (1932); Cass. Req. 29 juin 1847, S.48.1.705. But cf. 24 Laurent,
Principes de Droit Frangais 288-291, nos 294-296 (5 ed. 1893). See also Morrow,
Warranty of Quality: A Comparative Survey, 14 Tulane L. Rev. 529 (1940).
From this it would seem that French jurisprudence has extinguished the
distinction between good and bad faith vendors. That is not entirely true.
While a bad faith vendor is liable for both damnum emergens and lucrum
cessans, that Is, both actual loss and failure to realize anticipated profits,
the good faith vendor is liable only for damnum emergens. Cass. Req. 17
mars 1826, S.1926.1.371; 10 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil
Frangais 137, no 134 (1932). But cf. Limonges, 20 avril 1887, S.88.2.156. See
also Morrow, Warranty of Quality: A Comparative Survey, 14 Tulane L. Rev.
529, 537 et seq. (1940).
15. Dalloz, Codes Annotes, Art. 1645, nOS 15, 16 (1946); Baudry-Lacan-
tinerie et Saignet, De la vente et de L'exchange, no 436 (1908).
16. Ibid.
17. Pothier, Treatise on the Contract of Sale § 214 (Cushing's ed. 1839).
18. Boyd v. J. C. Penney Co., 195 So. 87 (La. App. 1940); J. I. Case
Threshing Machine Co. v. Davis, 131 La. 87, 59 So. 24 (1921); Moore's Assignee
v. King, 12 Mart. (O.S.) 261 (La. 1822).
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him in bad faith and allowing the injured plaintiff to collect
damages.'9
In the 1952 decision of Tuminello v. Mawby,20 the plaintiff,
purchaser, sued the defendant, builder, for damages sustained
due to a redhibitory defect in a house which he had bought. The
court conclusively held that Mawby was presumed to have knowl-
edge of the vice, since it had been constructed by him. Although
the jurisprudence is not as uniform as the Tuminello case might
lead us to believe,21 it seems settled that the present policy of
the court is to impute knowledge to the manufacturer. To sub-
stantiate this position, the French authorities have been quoted
liberally with approval.22
A classic rule of warranty both in the civil law23 and in the
common law24 restricts warranty to the limits of the contract.
In the instant case, no such privity of contract existed between
the plaintiff and defendant.
Article 2503 of the Civil Code, as amended, provides that the
buyer shall become subrogated to his seller's rights and actions
in warranty against all others. This article is in the section on
eviction, and no similar provision is in the section concerned
with redhibition. 25 However, in the recent case of McEachern v.
19. See p. 629, infra.
20. 220 La 733, 57 So. 2d 666 (1952).
21. Doyle v. Fuerst & Kraemer, Ltd., 129 La. 838, 56 So. 906 (1911);
George v. Shreveport Cotton Oil Co., 114 La. 498, 38 So. 432 (1905). Both of
these cases held that the manufacturer was chargeable with knowledge of
the defect. But ERodel Radio Corp. v. Shuler, 171 La. 469, 131 So. 462 (1930),
held that the manufacturer was not presumed to know of the defect, and
that he was liable for damages only if he actually knew of the vice. Clearly
the court was cognizant of the holding in the George and Doyle cases for
there is a dissent which cites those decisions as authority for the proposition
that the manufacturer is chargeable with knowledge of defects in its prod-
uct. However, the Tumneflo case has alleviated the difficulty of an attempted
reconciliation by means of a note. It is there said: "It is questionable that
the Kodel case repudiated or limited the Doyle case or the George case,
but, if it did, we consider the Doyle and George cases sound and would
refuse to follow the Kodel case here." 220 La. 733, 741, n. 1, 57 So. 2d 666,
669,,n. 1 (1952).
22. See Tuminello v. Mawby, 220 La. 733, 57 So. 2d 666 (1952).
23. Laclede Steel Co. v. Silas Mason Co., 67 F. Supp. 751 (D.C. La. 1946);
Strother v. Villere Coal Co., 15 So. 2d 383 (La. App. 1936); Note, 14 Tulane
L. Rev. 470 (1940); 17 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Saignat, Traite Thdorique et
Pratique du Droit Civil, de la vent et de l'exchange 369, no 432 (2 ed. 1900);
10 Hue, Commentaire Th6orique et Pratique du Code Civil 209, no 154 (1894).
24. 1 Williston, Sales, §§ 244,. 244a (2 ed. 1924), and cases cited therein.
25. Art. 2503, La. Civil Code of 1870, amended by La. Act 116 of 1924. The
following words were added: "But whether warranty be excluded or not the
buyer shall become subrogated to the seller's rights and actions in warranty
against all others."
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Plauche Lumber and Construction Company26 it was held with-
out discussion that Article 2503 applies to redhibitory defects as
well as warranty of title. This application appears to be in accord
with the civilian practice of extension by analogy. It also
appears to be in harmony with what the French are doing with-
out the aid of a specific provision of the Civil Code.
27
In France the subvendee may proceed directly against the
original vendor.2 8 The hypothesis followed is that by resale of
the defective goods, the vendee transmits to the subvendee all
the rights which the original vendor has conferred upon him by
the initial sale, including the right to redhibition in the case of
breach of warranty.29 There is authority in our code for the
position that the right to sue in warranty is included in the sale
from the retailer to the consumer, as an accessory to the thing.8 0
This may offer additional support for the position taken in the
McEachern case.
But the instant case did not find the warranty contract by
means of subrogation of rights from the vendee to the subvendee.
The basis of the holding was that there is a direct warranty by
the manufacturer to-the consumer. No codal authority has been
found for this type of action. However, it does appear logical
that the manufacturer intends the consumer to rely on his mani-
festation of quality, and therefore that the purchase of the bottle
by the consumer might be considered as an acceptance of the
warranty.
Here there was no sale by anyone to the plaintiff, as the
bottle of Coca-Cola had been given to her by a friend. The court
did not explain the finding of a warranty by the manufacturer
26. 220 La. 696, 57 So. 2d 405 (1952). There the court said: "We concur in
the ruling of the trial judge that although the buyer is subrogated to the
seller's right to action in warranty against all others, Art. 2503 ....... Note
that this case was actually against the vendee; the court used that language
to repel an attempt to sue both parties in solido.
27. See notes 28, 29, infra.
28. Art. 1641 et seq., French Civil Code; cf. Digest 21.1.1.8. See also 1
Domat, Civil Law (Strahan's tr. Cushing's 2 ed. 1861); Pothier, Treatise on
the Contract of Sale (Cushing's ed. 1839); Morrow, Warranty of Quality: A
Comparative Survey, 14 Tulane L. Rev. 529, 550 (1940).
29. See Smith, Third Party Beneficiaries in Louisiana: The Stipulation
Pour Autri, 11 Tulane L. Rev. 18 (1936). See also Cass. civ., 12 novembre
1884, S.86.1.149; Paris, 24 fevrier 1882, S.83.2.229; Bordeaux, 11 janvier 1888,
S.91.2.5, 10 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Franeais 145, no
138 (1932). See Art. 1166, French Civil Code. This article was changed by the
redactors of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825. See their comment thereon,
Louisiana Legal Archives, Projet of the Civil Code of 1825, 263 (1936).
30. Art. 2461, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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in favor of one who had no contractual relationship with anyone.
Perhaps the plaintiff was considered as the beneficiary of a stipu-
lation in her favor arising from the direct warranty by the manu-
facturer to the ultimate purchaser. If this be so, the court has
come a long way from what had previously been considered a
sufficient factual basis for permitting suits on the contract by a
third party beneficiary.31
On the other hand, if the contract relationship necessary to
a suit in warranty is found by extending the subrogation article
of the eviction section,32 or by considering the right in warranty
as an accessory to the sale,33 other problems are presented. The
subvendee would become subrogated to the rights of the vendee,
subject to the original conditions and limitations. One of these
qualifications requires that the buyer prove that the defect
existed at the time of the sale. Since "the sale" contemplated by
the original warranty was that to which the manufacturer was
a party, it would seem to follow that the subvendee must show
that the defect was present when the bottle was sold by the
manufacturer, or that there had been no interference with the
bottle since it left the plant of the defendant.
The decision in effect makes the manufacturer an "insurer"
of his product. Public opinion seems to have arrived at the point
where it places full responsibility upon the producer for any
injury caused by defects in his product.34 The legal difficulties
may be simplified by resorting to the tort doctrine of strict
liability. 5
It is respectfully submitted that an application of the perti-
nent articles of the Civil Code would have resulted in a more
stable decision, and would have made less change in the juris-
prudence. It appears that an application of the codal provisions
would lead to the conclusion that the consumer bears the burden
of negativing tampering. However, it is the opinion of this writer
that practical observation and realistic deliberation warrant the
31. Ibid. Cf. Smith-Allen and Curry Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Shreveport Water-
works Co., 113 La. 1091, 37 So. 980 (1905).
32. Art. 2503, La. Civil Code of 1870. See p. 627, supra.
33. Art. 2461, La. Civil Code of 1870.
34. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 692 (194i). See also Cotton,
A Note on the Civil Remedies of Injured Consumers, 1 Law and Contemp.
Prob. 67 (1933). Liability should only extend to normal injuries, and the plain-
tiff should have to trace the defect to the defendant. See Cudahy Packing Co.
v. Baskin, 120 Miss. 834, 155 So. 217 (1934).
35. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 690 (1941). See also Note,
18 Corn. L.Q. 445 (1933).
1953]
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enactment of legislation establishing a legal presumption that a
bottle of "soda pop" had not been adulterated by an officious
meddler between the time it left the plant of the producer and
the ultimate purchase by the consumer. 36
Louisiana will probably continue to follow the trend evi-
denced by the LeBlanc case and common law jurisdictionsY7
Future adjudication will most likely be characterized by increased
liability of manufacturers; the ultimate result could well be
strict ,liability.
William D. Brown, III
SALES-LESION BEYOND MOIETY-IMMvIOVABLES
AND MOVABLES MIXED
The plaintiff and the defendants were co-owners of a poultry
business. In 1948 the plaintiff sold his interest to the defendants
by two1 notarial acts executed simultaneously. One act trans-
ferred plaintiff's interest in the realty, the other his interest in
the movables. The plaintiff sought to rescind the sale of the
immovables on the ground of lesion beyond moiety. Parol evi-
dence was admitted, over the objection of the plaintiff, to support
the defendants' contention that the separation into two acts was
done for convenience and that the parties intended the two acts
to constitute a single transaction conveying both the realty and
the business for a lump price. The court held that the action of
lesion beyond moiety did not lie. "Rescission of sales for lesion
beyond moiety is not granted in sales involving movables.
' 2
(Italics supplied.) Corona v. Corona, 221 La. 576, 59 So. 2d 889
(1952).
The purpose of this note is to consider the validity of this
case insofar as it holds that the action of lesion beyond moiety
does not lie in a mixed sale of movables and immovables.
36. Of course, the defendant should have the right to destroy such a
presumption by producing positive evidence of interference.
37. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 690 (1941); Vold, Sales 464
(1931) and cases cited therein at note 75; 1 Williston, Sales §§ 244, 244a (2 ed.
1924) and cases cited therein.Many manufacturers seem to have abandoned all notions of escape from
charges of redhibitory defects. Bogert & Fink, Business Practice Regarding
Warranties in the Sale of Goods, 25 Ill. L. Rev. 400, 416 (1930).
1. A third act granted a mortgage in favor of plaintiff as security for the
unpaid portion of the purchase price.
2. Corona v. Corona, 221 La. 576, 584, 59 So. 2d 889, 892 (1952).
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